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“The differences of  race added greatly to 
the diffi culties of  the situation . . . . [T]hey remained 
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, 
and adhering to the customs and usages of  their own 
country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate 
with our people, or to make any change in their habits 
or modes of  living. As they grew in numbers each 
year the people . . . saw . . . great danger that at no 
distant day that portion of  our country would be 
overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to 
restrict their immigration.” – Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 18892
Introduction
Immigration from Mexico should be curtailed 
because it threatens the United States by eroding 
Anglo-Protestant culture. This thesis is advanced in 
Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity3
by Samuel Huntington, one of  the most widely 
cited political scientists on international relations.4
Huntington warns that Hispanic immigration to 
the United States threatens to transform the nation 
into “a country of  two languages, two cultures, and 
two peoples.”5 The current immigration debate in 
the United States shows that many people support 
Huntington’s proposition, as evidenced in Arizona 
Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070).6 Signed into law on 
April 23, 2010, SB 1070 is aimed at identifying and 
deporting “illegal immigrants.”7
In an attempt to facilitate this mission, 
the law requires local law enforcement offi cials to 
stop and demand identifi cation from anyone they 
“reasonably suspect” is in the country illegally.8
This of  course begs the question, what gives rise to 
“reasonable suspicion”? What does it mean to “look 
illegal”? For that matter, what does it mean to look 
“American”? The answers to these questions reveal 
the troubling marriage between race and immigration 
law. However, the underlying racism fueling SB 
1070 does not represent a new trend. In fact, U.S. 
immigration law uses racial difference as an indicator 
of  non-belonging and thus reifi es notions of  racial 
inferiority.
Ian Haney Lopez, a prominent critical race 
scholar, argues that the law not only refl ects but 
constructs social prejudice.9 The law thus becomes 
an instrument in constructing and reinforcing 
racial subordination.10 In this paper, I explore how 
immigration law, in particular, constructs notions 
of  racial inferiority by associating racial difference 
with noncitizen, or “illegal”, immigration status. 
Within the immigration law framework, racially 
different noncitizens are pitted against a seemingly 
homogenous group of  “American” citizens.
As Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt point 
out, citizenship has been used to refer to a whole 
host of  different ideas, including nationality, forms 
of  political participation, and entitlement to certain 
rights.11 I use citizenship to refer to the entitlement to 
belong. Within this defi nition of  citizenship, belonging 
encompasses both cultural and racial belonging in a 
nation. I recognize that in practice citizenship does 
not always grant automatic belonging in society. 
Instead, I believe that citizenship is used by those 
in power to determine who is worthy of  belonging, 
which history has revealed is a determination that 
largely turns on race.
As Gordon and Lenhardt also discuss, by 
defi ning inclusion, citizenship also defi nes exclusion.12
I argue that immigration law historically relied on 
citizenship to exclude noncitizens, who have been 
deemed unable to assimilate due to their race. In order 
to gain legal status as a citizen—in order to belong—
SPRING 2011 43
the noncitizen must assimilate to the citizen, who was 
legally defined as white until 1952.13 Based on this 
history, immigration law today continues to use racial 
difference as an indicator of  non-belonging, reifying 
notions of  racial inferiority in the process.
Kevin Johnson believes racism is visible in 
immigration law because society transfers its racism 
toward domestic minorities to noncitizens.14 While 
overt racism toward minority citizens is much more 
controversial, racism towards noncitizens can be 
masked by facially neutral gripes about noncitizens’ 
failure to assimilate, frustration over linguistic 
barriers, or intolerance of  “criminals”15 who have 
broken immigration laws. Johnson’s transference 
theory helps explain why immigration laws continue 
to justify a focus on racial difference to support race 
neutral policies like protecting national security and 
preserving American culture.16 The result of  this kind 
of  immigration law and policy is what Mae M. Ngai 
titles “alien citizenship.” As she explains, an “alien 
citizen” is a U.S. Citizen “by virtue of  her birth in the 
United States but whose citizenship is suspect, if  not 
denied, on account of  the racialized identity of  her 
immigrant ancestry.”17
I argue that SB 1070 provides a contemporary 
example of  the way immigration law constructs racial 
difference as an indicator of  non-belonging, reifying 
notions of  racial inferiority. Specifically, SB 1070 
overtly attempts to exclude unwanted immigrants 
and does so by mandating racial profiling. Arizona’s 
new law illustrates Johnson’s theory of  transference 
as well as Ngai’s concept of  “alien citizenship.” SB 
1070 results from the evolution of  this nation’s 
immigration laws. Particularly important in shaping 
SB 1070 is the plenary power doctrine, which currently 
affords the political branches unfettered discretion 
in regulating immigration. As a result of  this broad 
discretion, noncitizens are stripped of  important 
constitutional rights under federal immigration law. 
SB 1070 employs a similar type of  constitutional 
rights-stripping.
Section One of  this paper highlights four 
moments in history that illustrate the way immigration 
law constructs race. Section Two discusses which 
constitutional protections are denied to noncitizens 
in the immigration context. Section Three illustrates 
how constitutional rights-stripping of  noncitizens 
leads to increases in racial profiling, both within and 
outside of  the immigration context. Section Four 
argues that SB 1070 is a product of  this nation’s 
historical racism towards immigrants. This section 
frames SB 1070 within Johnson’s transference theory 
and Ngai’s idea of  alien citizenship. Finally, Section 
Five provides recommendations for dismantling the 
underlying racism present in immigration law.
Section	One:	A	History	of	Racism	in	
Immigration	Law
Perhaps more alarming than SB 1070’s express 
sanction of  racial profiling is the consistent theme 
of  racism present in the history of  immigration law. 
The evolution of  U.S. immigration law demonstrates 
the political and judicial branches’ repeated use of  
race to deny different groups citizenship status. This 
trend illustrates Gordon and Lenhardt’s theory that 
citizenship defines exclusion, not merely inclusion. 
While immigration law has changed over time, what 
remains the same are notions of  racial inferiority 
associated with noncitizens. The history of  U.S. 
immigration law reveals many instances of  race being 
used to signify non-belonging, but I focus on four 
moments: 1) Dred Scott v. Sandford,18 2) Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States19 (the Chinese Exclusion Act case), 
3) the “naturalization cases,” and 4) the Mexican 
Repatriation and Operation Wetback.
Dred Scott Sets the Stage
Immigration to the United States is a 
phenomenon that traces to the founding of  the 
nation.20 While immigration was largely unregulated 
during roughly the first 100 years of  the United 
States’ existence, by 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act 
(“the Act”) was one of  the first major attempts at 
controlling the flow of  people into the country.21 The 
legal precedent established in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States,22 a case arising from the Act, created the legal 
framework for immigration law in the United States. 
However, it is important to understand how Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, decided thirty-three years earlier, set 
the stage for Chae Chan Ping by first characterizing 
citizenship in terms of  racial belonging and 
assimilability.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford23 the United States 
Supreme Court held that African Americans, even 
those born free, were not U.S. Citizens.24 The Court 
denied Dred Scott the ability to sue in federal 
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court because it deemed that he was not a citizen 
of  the United States.25 The Supreme Court turned 
to race to determine whether the original framers 
intended to include slaves within the meaning of  
the Constitution.26 The Court presented exhaustive 
evidence of  racial animosity 
towards African Americans 
in order to justify not granting 
them citizenship status under 
the Constitution:
We refer to these his-
torical facts for the 
purpose of  showing 
the fixed opinions concerning that race, 
upon which the statesmen of  that 
day spoke and acted. It is necessary 
to do this, in order to determine 
whether the general terms used 
in the Constitution of  the United 
States, as to the rights of  man 
and the rights of  the people, was 
intended to include them . . . .27
While this case holds great meaning for many 
reasons beyond the scope of  this paper, it is also 
significant because the Court expressly characterized 
citizenship in terms of  racial belonging. Thus, the 
Court focused on Scott’s racial difference as a reason 
why he did not belong to the nation in the form of  
a citizen. Although this decision was later overturned 
by the Fourteenth Amendment,28 its characterization 
of  noncitizens as racially different “others” set the 
jurisprudential stage for the Chinese Exclusions Act 
case.
Chinese Exclusion and the Plenary Power Doctrine
Chae Chan Ping set forth the plenary power 
doctrine, allowing the political branches unfettered 
power to regulate immigration. This discretionary 
and far reaching power was justified in the name of  
“protecting” the nation from the danger posed by 
racially different foreign nationals. The holdings of  
this case and the reasoning of  the Court have set the 
framework of  immigration law enforcement until 
present day. The Court’s reasoning focused on the 
Chinese’s racial difference as the reason why they 
failed to assimilate and the threat they posed by that 
failure.29
On May 8, 1882, Congress passed the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, which allowed the Executive 
branch to exclude Chinese nationals from entering 
the United States.30 Under the Act, Chinese nationals 
already living in the United States needed to obtain 
a certificate of  reentry if  they 
left the country and wanted 
to return.31 Chae Chan Ping 
was a Chinese-born laborer 
living in California during the 
California Gold Rush, which 
lasted from approximately 
1848 to 1855.32 Before leaving 
the country to visit China, Ping obtained a certificate 
of  reentry, as required by the Act.33 However, during 
his absence from the country, Congress amended 
the Act to ban reentry of  Chinese, including those 
who had obtained a certificate to do so.34 Ping was 
barred from entering the country and challenged his 
exclusion, which the Court upheld.35
 Justice Field, writing for a unanimous court, 
pointed to the Chinese laborers’ race as the underlying 
reason why they could not assimilate to U.S. culture:
The differences of  race added 
greatly to the difficulties of  the situ-
ation. . . . [T]hey remained strangers 
in the land, residing apart by them-
selves, and adhering to the customs 
and usages of  their own country. 
It seemed impossible for them to 
assimilate with our people, or to 
make any change in their habits or 
modes of  living.36
The analysis then seamlessly transitioned 
into the danger that the Chinese posed due to the 
increase in their population:
As they grew in numbers each year 
the people of  the coast saw, or 
believed they saw, in the facility of  
immigration, and in the crowded 
millions of  China, where population 
presses upon the means of  subsis-
tence, great danger that at no dis-
tant day that portion of  our country 
would be overrun by them, unless 
prompt action was taken to restrict 
their immigration. The people there 
whether the original framers intended 
to include slaves within the meaning 
of  the Constitution
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accordingly petitioned earnestly for 
protective legislation.37
It is clear that the Court based the racial 
difference of  the Chinese on their inability to 
assimilate, which posed a 
“threat” to the people of  the 
United States. Justice Field 
paints a picture of  “others” 
overtaking the nation.38 In the 
eyes of  the Court, as well as 
those of  Congress, the increased 
presence of  the Chinese—a 
group viewed as so racially 
different that they could not blend in with their 
surrounding population—was something from which 
the people of  the United States needed protection. 
It is through this framework of  non-belonging and 
danger that the Court not only justifies, but promotes 
the exclusion of  the Chinese. This logic is further 
evidenced when the Court declares:
If…the government of  the United 
States, through its legislative depart-
ment, considers the presence of  for-
eigners of  a different race in this coun-
try, who will not assimilate with us, to 
be dangerous to its peace and security, 
their exclusion is not to be stayed 
because at the time there are no 
actual hostilities with the nation of  
which the foreigners are subjects.39
Chae Chan Ping built on the notion in Dred 
Scott of  racial difference as creating a barrier to 
assimilation. The Court in both cases views an 
inability to assimilate due to racial difference as the 
ultimate marker of  non-belonging. Going a step 
further, the Court in Chae Chan Ping characterizes 
the racial difference of  noncitizens as a threat to 
the nation, which justifies the political branches in 
taking whatever measures they deem appropriate in 
regulating immigration.40 The result of  this rationale 
is the plenary power doctrine, which ultimately leads 
to constitutional rights-stripping of  noncitizens.
The Naturalization Process: Determining Whiteness
The “naturalization cases” refer to the 
set of  cases in which immigrants argued that they 
should be allowed to naturalize under the provisions 
of  the Naturalization Act of  1790 that extended 
citizenship to “free white persons” and, after the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “aliens of  African nativity 
and . . . persons of  African descent.”41 In these cases 
courts determined whether a 
particular group could meet the 
prerequisite of  being white in 
order to naturalize. The cases 
focused on race as an indicator 
of  whether immigrants could 
assimilate into U.S. culture, 
which was another way of  
determining if  they belonged 
and were thus worthy of  
citizenship status. The race-based requirement to 
naturalize was not lifted until 1952 with the passage 
of  the McCarran-Walter Act.42
It is worth noting that as a reaction to Dred 
Scott and Reconstruction efforts to rectify gross 
inequalities, the Naturalization Act of  1790 was 
amended to include “aliens of  African nativity and 
persons of  African descent.”43 As a result of  this 
amendment, a black-white dichotomy of  races within 
the naturalization system was created. The fact that all 
naturalization cases consisted of  courts determining 
whether a particular group could be considered white 
indicates that the black-white dichotomy was in fact 
a racial hierarchy in which whites were the dominate 
group to which noncitizens must conform. As such, 
white was further constructed as the superior race to 
which immigrants should assimilate if  they were to 
enjoy the full benefits of  U.S. citizenship.
For instance, In re Halladjian, Judge Lowell in 
the Massachusetts Circuit Court granted citizenship to 
four Armenians by relying on the popular usage of  the 
term “free white person.”44 The judge turned to late 
eighteenth-century census documents that described 
the inhabitants of  the former colonies.45 Judge Lowell 
reasoned that since the censuses expressly mentioned 
“Indians, Chinese, and Japanese,” the term white 
was used as a “catch-all word to include everybody 
else.”46 While recognizing that “there is no European 
or white race,” Judge Lowell nonetheless allowed the 
notion of  whiteness to continue as a prerequisite to 
naturalizing. He granted the Armenians citizenship 
based on the fact they could conceivably fall under 
the catch all description of  whiteness since their race 
was not explicitly mentioned in the censuses.47
The Court’s reasoning focused  
on the Chinese’s racial difference 
as the reason why they failed to 
assimilate and the threat they  
posed by that failure.
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However, in Ozawa the Supreme Court 
denied a Japanese man citizenship because he was 
deemed as falling outside the Caucasian race and thus 
could not be granted citizenship.48 The Court rejected 
a color test to define whiteness and instead relied 
on the meaning of  Caucasian as “a zone of  more or 
less debatable ground outside of  which, upon the one 
hand, are those clearly eligible, and outside of  which, 
upon the other hand, are those clearly ineligible for 
citizenship.”49 Like the Massachusetts Court, the 
Supreme Court raised doubt about the concreteness 
of  the meaning of  the term “white” or “Caucasian” 
but nonetheless chose to advance the notion of  
whiteness as a requisite of  citizenship.50
In United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,51 an 
Indian national contested the denial of  his citizenship 
application. The Supreme Court held that “upper 
class Hindus” could not be classified as white and 
were therefore barred from naturalizing.52 The Court 
conceded that trying to define whiteness through 
biology or reference to Caucasian ancestry was 
elusive and not scientifically sound.53 However, the 
Court nonetheless connected whiteness with the 
ability to assimilate by rationalizing that Europeans 
were white because they could “merge into the mass 
of  our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks 
of  their European origin.”54 Within this definition of  
white, assimilation did not mean merely adjusting to 
“American culture” but instead losing one’s identity 
to blend in with the white majority.55 Hindus were 
denied white status precisely because they “would 
retain indefinitely the clear evidence of  their 
ancestry.”56
Mexican Repatriation and Operation Wetback:  
History Repeats Itself
During the Great Depression, President 
Hoover authorized the removal of  Mexican nationals, 
although more than half  of  those removed turned out 
to be U.S. Citizens.57 Due to the economic downturn, 
the repatriation was intended to ensure that only 
“true Americans” held jobs in the United States.58 To 
assist in the round-up, all over the nation police raided 
public spaces, including churches, and forced people 
of  Mexican ancestry onto trains and buses headed for 
the U.S.-Mexico border.59 By the end of  the decade-
long deportation campaign, deemed “repatriation,” 
an estimated one million people of  Mexican ancestry 
were removed from the country.60
History repeated itself  in 1954—just two 
years after race requirements were removed from the 
naturalization system. Congress passed Operation 
Wetback, intended to deport Mexican “wetbacks,” a 
term legitimately used in mainstream discourse to refer 
to illegal Mexican immigrants.61 Operation Wetback 
went hand-in-hand with the Bracero Program set up 
by the United States to import temporary Mexican 
agricultural workers in order to address labor shortages 
due to World War II.62 While the United States 
welcomed the labor of  Mexican nationals through 
the Bracero program, it simultaneously rejected the 
presence of  Mexican nationals beyond their capacity 
as laborers. Hence, Operation Wetback was intended 
to address the increase in illegal immigration that had 
grown alongside the Bracero Program.63
Under the program, undocumented 
Mexican nationals and Mexican nationals who were 
legally present under the Bracero Program were 
indistinguishable.64 Therefore, Operation Wetback’s 
main mission of  deporting “illegal” Mexican 
immigrants served more as a cover to remove all 
Mexican nationals deemed a threat to society. As 
evidenced by the title of  the deportation campaign, 
once again racial difference fueled the exclusion 
of  immigrants who were deemed harmful to 
society. Under Operation Wetback, more than one 
million people were deported. 65 Like the Mexican 
Repatriation, many deportees were U.S. citizens.66
Section	Two:	Extra-constitutionality	of	
Immigration	Law
The evolution of  immigration law since 
Chae Chan Ping illustrates that, as a result of  the 
plenary power doctrine, fundamental constitutional 
protections are applied in a highly restrictive manner 
in the immigration context. Challenging government 
action that regulates immigration is very difficult 
since the plenary power doctrine also ensures that 
courts provide deference to the political branches 
regarding immigration laws.67 Without a check on 
this unfettered discretion, the political branches are 
able to abuse their power, as evidenced in federal 
immigration laws that strip constitutional rights from 
noncitizens and promote racial profiling.
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Noncitizens are described as not being 
punished by deportation but merely regulated.68 
Therefore, immigration proceedings are characterized 
as civil rather than criminal.69 As a consequence, 
many of  the constitutional protections afforded to 
criminal defendants are stripped from noncitizens 
undergoing deportation proceedings. For instance, 
noncitizens who undergo immigration proceedings 
are not afforded many basic constitutional rights 
under Article I of  the Constitution, the Fourth 
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth 
Amendment. Specifically, immigration regulations 
can be applied retroactively, in violation of  the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of  Article I, section 9 of  the 
United States Constitution.70 In addition, the Fourth 
Amendment remedy for suppression of  evidence 
obtained in an illegal search or seizure is applied in 
a very limited fashion to noncitizens.71 Noncitizens 
do not enjoy a presumption of  innocence72 and they 
receive no Fifth Amendment protection regarding 
the right to remain silent; silence can be used against 
them.73 Noncitizens are also not afforded the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees to an impartial jury, a speedy 
trial, and right to counsel.74 Furthermore, the rules of  
evidence do not apply to immigration proceedings75 
and the government may use secret evidence against 
noncitizens.76 The constitutional rights stripping of  
noncitizens made possible by the plenary power 
doctrine, makes immigration law immune from many 
standard constitutional protections. As a result, police 
action that would otherwise be unconstitutional is 
considered legal when executed in the immigration 
context. A prime example is the widespread use of  
racial profiling to regulate immigration.
Section	Three:	Using	Race	to	Identify	
Noncitizens
Current Supreme Court precedent allows 
for the use of  racial profiling in immigration 
enforcement.77 Amnesty International defines racial 
profiling as:
[T]he targeting of  individuals and 
groups by law enforcement officials, 
even partially, on the basis of  race, 
ethnicity, national origin, or religion, 
except where there is trustworthy 
information, relevant to the locality 
and timeframe, that links persons 
belonging to one of  the aforemen-
tioned groups to an identified crimi-
nal incident or scheme.78
Based on this definition, the legal use of  
racial profiling within the immigration context 
suggests that race becomes “trustworthy information” 
regarding a person’s likelihood of  being unlawfully 
present in the country. Current immigration case law 
demonstrates this correlation.
Under Brignoni-Ponce, the Court established 
the legal use of  racial profiling as a tool to enforce 
immigration law.79 Specifically, “Mexican-appearance” 
in conjunction with other articulable facts was 
described as creating the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to stop someone under the Fourth 
Amendment. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Border Patrol had 
set up a checkpoint in San Clemente, California.80 
One evening, while the checkpoint was closed due 
to bad weather, Border Patrol officers observed 
traffic from their vehicle parked on the side of  the 
highway.81 They stopped respondent’s car, stating 
that the respondent’s Mexican-looking appearance 
was their only basis for doing so.82 Although the 
Court found that Mexican appearance alone is not a 
sufficient reason for stopping a person, it can be used 
in conjunction with other factors.83
Brignoni-Ponce is a pivotal case because it 
validated the use of  racial stereotypes to define 
“Mexican appearance” and connected race with the 
likelihood of  illegal conduct. The Court took the 
government at its word that trained officers can detect 
“the characteristic appearance” of  people who live in 
Mexico based on “such factors as the mode of  dress 
and haircut.”84 In no way did the Court challenge this 
allegation. In fact, “mode of  dress and haircut” are 
merely examples of  what immigration officers use to 
detect someone from Mexico. Immigration officials 
may be explicitly using race and accents as factors, 
but the Court makes no inquiry into this. By not 
challenging the government’s assertion, the Court 
effectively allowed the government to decide what it 
means to “look Mexican.”
The Court goes a step further by correlating 
“Mexican appearance” with the likelihood of  being 
unlawfully present in the United States. In the 
Court’s words, “[t]he likelihood that any given person 
of  Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to 
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make Mexican appearance a relevant factor.”85 The 
Court concluded its opinion by stating the Fourth 
Amendment requires that when a person is stopped 
there must be at least “reasonable suspicion” that 
the person is an “alien.”86 In reaching its holding, the 
Court allowed the notion of  “Mexican appearance” 
based on racial stereotypes to create suspicion of  
illegal activity. Brignoni-Ponce remains the law and 
therefore, in the context of  immigration regulation, 
“looking Mexican” carries a presumption of  illegality.
The correlation between race and illegal 
conduct has been extended to target other ethnic 
groups in the context of  the War on Terror. In 
Farag, the Government cited Brignoni-Ponce to 
allow air transportation officials to consider “Arab 
appearance” as a relevant factor when stopping air 
passengers because all of  the 9-11 hijackers were 
“Middle Eastern males.”87 Even though the Court 
rejected the Government’s argument, it did reaffirm 
and distinguish the use of  race in Brignoni-Ponce 
since that case was formally within the context of  
immigration enforcement.88
Even though in Farag the Court rejected 
“Arab appearance” as a relevant factor when stopping 
air passengers, the government need only turn to 
its official national security policy to consider race. 
Federal national security policy recognizes that racial 
profiling, in certain contexts, is considered legal:
In investigating or preventing 
threats to national security or other 
catastrophic events (including the 
performance of  duties related to 
air transportation security), or in 
enforcing laws protecting the integ-
rity of  the Nation’s borders, Federal 
law enforcement officers may not 
consider race or ethnicity except to the 
extent permitted by the Constitution and 
laws of  the United States.89
Based on the precedent set forth in Brignoni-
Ponce, it is likely that the government may target 
different ethnicities in its national security efforts until 
a case comes before the court forbidding specific uses 
of  ethnic appearance, such as “Arab appearance.” 
With the increase of  local officials obtaining the ability 
to conduct immigration enforcement, 90 after Brignoni-
Ponce, racial profiling will continue to be widely used 
under the guise of  immigration enforcement.
Using racial profiling as a valid immigration 
enforcement tool allows racial stereotypes to gain 
more social currency, both within and outside of  
the immigration context. When immigration law 
allows race to indicate a valid suspicion of  illegal 
presence, race becomes a factor that generally indicates 
illegal activity. Furthermore, racial profiling of  
noncitizens inevitably affects citizens of  the same 
race. This means that U.S. citizens who happen to 
the same race as targeted noncitizens will be subject 
to the same racialized standards of  reasonable 
suspicion. Countless examples of  this reality include 
the deportation of  U.S. citizens based on “looking 
illegal.”91 Additionally, racial profiling techniques 
used by local law enforcement officials under 287(g) 
are likely to bleed over into standard law enforcement 
efforts.
Section	Four:	SB	1070
SB 1070 explicitly states that the policy 
behind the law is “attrition through enforcement,”92 
or exclusion of  “unlawful aliens” by making their 
lives so difficult that they voluntarily choose to leave 
the country rather than being subject to deportation.93 
As the law’s author, Arizona Senator Russell Pearce, 
states “Arizona has made it clear through our policies 
that illegal immigrants are not welcome, and they are 
self-deporting from the state.”94 SB 1070 creates new 
immigration crimes and mandates that law enforcement 
officials determine the immigration status of  a 
person when “reasonable suspicion” exists that she 
is “an alien who is unlawfully present in the United 
States.”95 In fact, the law allows Arizona citizens to 
sue officials or agencies they believe are not enforcing 
immigration law to the full extent permissible under 
federal law.96
In many ways SB 1070 is the modern 
incarnation of  Chae Chan Ping because it explicitly 
attempts to exclude an immigrant community based 
on the alleged threat that that community poses to 
U.S. citizens. In the process of  excluding, SB 1070, 
like Chae Chan Ping, reifies notions of  racial inferiority 
by using race as an indicator of  non-belonging. In 
Chae Chan Ping, race was a barrier to assimilation 
and thus justified excluding the Chinese. Under SB 
1070, racial profiling is used to identify potential 
“illegal immigrants” who “are not welcome” in 
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Arizona. As a result, many critics have referred to 
SB 1070 as the “breathing while brown” law.97 The 
mandated determination of  immigration status 
based on “reasonable suspicion” is akin to mandated 
racial profiling of  mainly Hispanic immigrants. This 
reality is confirmed by Arizona’s failure to articulate 
on what grounds other than race law enforcement 
officials will base their reasonable suspicion that a 
person is unlawfully present. Arizona Congressmen 
have fumbled as they describe factors other than 
race that create reasonable suspicion of  unlawful 
presence: attire, accents, grooming, and shoes.98 It 
appears that SB 1070 attempts to codify Brignoni-Ponce 
and mandate that “Mexican appearance” be used in 
enforcing immigration—despite politicians claiming 
that race will not serve as a factor.
However disturbing the law’s explicit focus 
on race, what is more problematic is that the current 
legal battle over the law is focused on notions of  
preemption: whether Arizona’s law conflicts with 
federal immigration enforcement. While other legal 
arguments regarding equal protection have been 
advanced to overturn SB 1070,99 preemption remains 
the strongest threat to the law. This suggests that the 
true legal battle is over who gets to do the excluding 
and racial profiling: the federal government or the 
states? Recognizing that federal immigration law is 
nearly if  not equally as troubling as SB 1070, I focus 
on the Arizona law given its explicit representation of  
Johnson’s notion of  transference and Ngai’s theory of  
alien citizenship. In light of  this, the popular support 
SB 1070 has received across the nation suggests that 
immigration law continues to be a powerful vehicle 
of  racial subordination.
Criminalizing Immigrants as Transference
SB 1070 creates new immigration crimes, 
further criminalizing the immigrant community. 
Kevin Johnson advances the theory of  transference, 
which occurs when society transfers its racism 
towards minority citizens to noncitizens.100 As 
Johnson explains, “immigration status, combined 
with race, ma[kes] such treatment more socially 
acceptable and legally defensible.”101 Johnson traces 
transference, as it applies in the immigration context, 
to the psychological theory that feelings toward one 
group of  people are refocused on another.102 As a 
result of  transference, Johnson believes that a society’s 
treatment of  noncitizens of  color reveals its feelings 
toward citizens of  color.103 Thus, Johnson describes 
differential treatment of  citizens and noncitizens as a 
“magic mirror” that reveals “how dominant society 
might treat domestic minorities if  legal constraints 
were abrogated.”104 Not only does Johnson’s theory 
help explain why immigration law has historically 
treated noncitizens as racially inferior, it also explains 
how immigration law implicates all citizens of  color 
regardless of  citizenship—even though citizenship 
continues to serve as a tool to exclude noncitizens 
on the basis of  race. SB 1070 is, therefore, a grave 
warning sign for all citizens of  color in Arizona.
Unlike federal law, SB 1070 makes it a state 
crime for an “unauthorized alien” to apply for a job 
or to solicit work publically.105 The latter crime would 
affect mainly Mexican day laborers who congregate 
in certain areas of  town where people come to 
solicit work.106 A related crime includes knowingly 
transporting a person who is unlawfully present 
in the country.107 Many of  these new crimes come 
with mandatory jail times.108 Additionally, SB 1070 
makes not carrying immigration papers a crime.109 In 
order to enforce these new criminal laws, SB 1070 
allows law enforcement officials to ask for proof  of  
citizenship during a “legal stop, detention, or arrest,” 
which can include questioning people who are victims 
of  crimes themselves or stopped for offenses like 
traffic violations or loitering.110 If  a lawfully present 
noncitizen111 is stopped and does not have proper 
immigration papers, he or she will be subject to arrest 
and a fee of  $500 for a first time violation.112 The 
penalties associated with not carrying one’s papers 
makes life difficult for all noncitizens, suggesting that 
all immigrants in Arizona are unwelcome—not just 
those who are undocumented.
In 2006, Hispanics accounted for 29.1% 
of  Arizona’s total population.113 This figure is 
approximately twice as high as the Hispanic population 
in the rest of  the United States, which was 14.8% the 
same year.114 The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 
in 2006, 6.9% to 7.7% of  the State’s total population 
was undocumented.115 These figures suggest that the 
percentage of  undocumented people in Arizona as of  
2006 was not overwhelmingly large. However, these 
figures also suggest that the increase in Hispanics in 
Arizona was substantial. Applying Johnson’s theory 
of  transference, it appears that Arizona’s perception 
of  being “invaded” by “illegals”116 indicates an 
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underlying fear of  a general increase in the Hispanic 
population as a whole. In fact, the Pew Hispanic 
Center found that while the native- and foreign-born 
Hispanic population grew substantially from 2000 
to 2006, so did the non-Hispanic population.117 On 
a percentage basis, “Hispanics have contributed no 
more to population growth in Arizona than they have 
to the growth of  the U.S. population.”118
If  the Hispanic population grew at a similar 
rate as the non-Hispanic population, Johnson’s 
transference theory indicates that Arizona’s fear of  
“illegal immigration” is based on the fear of  a general 
increase of  the Hispanic population, despite the fact 
that in 2006, the figure of  undocumented people was 
at most 7.7%. In other words, Arizona’s “crackdown” 
on the “invasion” of  Hispanic “illegals” is not only 
inaccurate, but indicates that fear of  an increase in 
the Hispanic population has translated into a fear of  
an increase in noncitizens. As Johnson points out, it 
is much more socially acceptable to target noncitizens 
of  color than it is to target citizens of  color.119 As 
a result, Arizona’s “crackdown” maintains popular 
support in the state because society has equated 
Hispanics with illegal immigration.
Due to an increase in the Hispanic population, 
even though this increase did not outmatch the 
growth of  the non-Hispanic population, Arizona 
has transferred its general fear of  Hispanics to 
noncitizens by over criminalizing immigrants. Samuel 
Huntington’s disapproval of  Hispanic immigration is 
mirrored in SB 1070. This fear and racial animosity 
results in the nation’s toughest immigration law.
Reasonable Suspicion as Mandated Racial Profiling: 
Recreating the Mexican “Illegal Alien”
Particularly troubling is SB 1070’s mandate to 
determine immigration status based on “reasonable 
suspicion” that a person is unlawfully present in the 
United States.120 This mandate leads to increased 
racial profiling. As federal law demonstrates, using 
Mexican appearance as a factor in determining 
immigration status is lawful.121 However, federal law 
indicates that using race may be permitted, whereas 
SB 1070’s requirement that immigration law must be 
enforced “to the full extent that federal law permits” 
suggests that race must be used as a factor. SB 1070 
states that race must not be the “sole” factor in 
determining immigration status, suggesting that it is 
indeed a central factor.122
This increased racial profiling highlights 
what Mae M. Ngai describes as alien citizenship. Ngai 
describes the alien citizen as “an American citizen by 
virtue of  her birth in the United States but whose 
citizenship is suspect, if  not denied on account of  
the racialized identity of  her immigrant ancestry.”123 
Ngai argues that non-white groups are deemed 
immutable, “making [their] nationality a kind of  
racial trait.”124 As a result, non-white groups obtain a 
permanent foreignness that leads to a nullification of  
U.S. citizenship.125 SB 1070’s mandated racial profiling 
creates a similar type of  permanent foreignness as 
Hispanics, regardless of  citizenship status, become 
susceptible to being stopped and asked to prove their 
legal status by producing their papers. No limit exists 
on the amount of  times a person may be stopped, 
leading to the possibility that one must constantly 
prove his belonging. As a result, Hispanics carry a 
strong presumption of  foreignness under SB 1070. 
As Ngai states, “[r]acism thus creates a problem of  
misrecognition for the citizen of  . . . Latino descent 
. . . .”126
To be clear, Ngai believes that alien 
citizenship is a form of  rights nullification that has 
existed throughout history, specifically exemplified 
by the territorial removal of  one million Mexicans 
during the Great Depression (more than half  of  
whom were U.S. Citizens) and the internment of  
120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II 
(two-thirds of  whom were U.S. Citizens).127 Ngai 
traces the creation of  Mexican “illegal alien” to the 
Jim Crow segregation of  Mexicans in the southwest 
who were stripped of  belonging.128 I argue that SB 
1070 serves as the rebirth of  the Mexican “illegal 
alien.”
Public Reaction to SB 1070
If  immigration law is a “helpful gauge for 
measuring this nation’s racial sensibilities”129 as Kevin 
Johnson suggests, what does the nation’s reaction to 
SB 1070 indicate? A survey conducted on October 
31, 2010 revealed that fifty percent of  Arizona voters 
believe that SB 1070 has positively affected the state’s 
image (this figure is up from forty-one percent in May 
of  2010).130 The same survey also revealed that sixty-
one percent of  the state’s voters still favor the new 
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immigration law.131 In fact, Governor Jan Brewer, 
who signed SB 1070 into law, easily won reelection in 
the 2010 mid-term elections.132
On a national level, civil rights groups have 
certainly voiced strong disapproval of  SB 1070.133 
Litigation intended to overturn the law has also been 
somewhat successful.134 However, since SB 1070 
was signed into law on April 23, 2010, twenty-two 
states have introduced legislation modeled on the 
new law.135 These “copycat” laws suggest support 
for SB 1070 by much of  the country. In fact, during 
the 2010 mid-term elections, SB 1070 served as a 
major platform issue to gain political support. As 
Politico reported, in order to win votes, Republican 
candidates had to explicitly state their support for the 
law.136 Furthermore, the day after the injunction on 
the law, “59 percent of  American voters wanted an 
Arizona-style law in their state, while only 32 percent 
did not.”137 States with high Hispanic populations 
show support for an Arizona-style law above the 
national average. For instance, sixty-two percent of  
Texas voters favor a law similar to Arizona’s and sixty 
percent of  Colorado voters agree.138
The plenary power doctrine set forth in Chae 
Chan Ping has led to federal immigration law that strips 
noncitizens of  crucial constitutional protections. 
This reality has set the stage for state laws like SB 
1070 that represent states’ frustration with federal 
enforcement. Johnson’s notion of  transference 
is evidenced when states like Arizona with large 
Hispanic populations develop animosity towards their 
immigrant populations and show frustration over the 
federal government not taking full advantage of  the 
plenary power it has over immigration enforcement. 
While SB 1070 represents the modern incarnation of  
Chae Chan Ping, the history of  U.S. immigration law 
suggests that Arizona’s attempts at exclusion based 
on racial difference should come as no surprise. 
The type of  alien citizenship that exists for many in 
Arizona is likely to spread as national support for SB 
1070 remains strong and states continue to introduce 
copycat laws.
Section	Five:	Recommendations
I recognize that the thesis driving 
the arguments in my paper is unpleasant: U.S. 
immigration law uses racial difference as an indicator 
of  non-belonging and thus reifies notions of  racial 
inferiority. However, this truth is undeniable in light 
of  the evolution of  immigration law from Chae 
Chan Ping to SB 1070. Historically, immigration 
regulation in the United States has explicitly relied 
on race and notions of  racial inferiority to deny 
people citizenship status. Under current immigration 
law, Supreme Court precedent allows for “Mexican 
appearance” to serve as a factor in determining a 
person’s immigration status. Most recently, national 
support for SB 1070, a law that in practice mandates 
racial profiling, represents the nation’s support for 
excluding racially different noncitizens. In the United 
States, it is far too easy to exercise racism under the 
guise of  immigration enforcement.
This grim reality can only be altered by 
public education efforts that bring to light this 
nation’s historic and contemporary racist treatment 
of  immigrants. Additionally, civil rights and 
immigrants’ rights organizations must argue that 
racial discrimination in the immigration context 
deserves strict scrutiny—the plenary power doctrine 
should not trump the Supreme Court’s practice of  
applying strict scrutiny whenever fundamental rights 
are implicated.
Public Education
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inspiring words are 
used by immigrants’ rights advocates across the nation, 
“Remember, remember always that all of  us, and you 
and I especially, are descended from immigrants and 
revolutionists.”139 However, racist immigration laws 
and policies throughout our nation’s history reveal 
that society has not been quick to remember that all 
U.S. citizens are “descended from immigrants.” If  
people have reflected on their immigrant past, then 
they are quick to forget since it is difficult to detect 
empathy and tolerance in our nation’s immigration 
laws. In fact, the Senate recently blocked the DREAM 
Act, a bill intended to put undocumented immigrant 
students on a path to citizenship.140
I am someone who has dedicated the past 
seven years to learning about immigration to the 
United States, as well as global migration patterns. 
Only until I entered law school did I learn of  
the problematic use of  race within this nations’ 
immigration jurisprudence. It appears that our 
nation’s racist treatment of  immigrants is a secret 
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history to which most U.S. citizens have not been 
exposed. In fact, one of  the most famous symbols of  
our country is the melting pot, which many people 
believe represents the idea that all people, regardless 
of  race, religion, or culture, achieve harmony within 
the United States. However, the “melting pot,” is a 
metaphor that describes the process of  assimilation 
in order to achieve homogeneity in society.141 The play 
by Israel Zangwill, The Melting Pot,142 popularized the 
term. As our nation’s naturalization laws until 1952 
show, that “melting pot” never included people of  
color since being American also meant being white.
Education textbooks must include more 
information about moments like the Mexican 
Repatriation, Operation Wetback, and other shameful 
moments in immigration history. A 2006 survey of  
nine American history textbooks found that only 
one dedicated more than half  a page to the Mexican 
Repatriation.143 In fact, as future generations learn 
of  the 9-11 terrorist attacks through textbooks, they 
should also learn about the rise in hate crimes against 
Muslim Americans and the deportation of  315,000 
“alien absconders” selectively applied to Muslims, 
Arabs and South Asians shortly after 9-11.144 However, 
before parents can promote exposing their children 
to immigration history in the United States, they 
too must learn of  this secret past. Only by exposing 
the general public to this nation’s historic treatment 
of  immigrants will people begin to see through the 
illusion of  race-neutral immigration laws.
Breaking Myths and Humanizing the Immigrant 
Experience
In order to dismantle fear campaigns created 
around the alleged threats that immigrants pose, 
additional public education campaigns are needed to 
break the myths that permeate the public’s perception 
of  immigration.145 While doing so, these campaigns 
should humanize the immigrant experience by 
revealing statistics regarding mixed status families.
For instance, MALDEF’s Truth in Immigration 
campaign should serve as a model campaign for other 
organizations. Through this campaign, MALDEF 
rebuts statistical and legal inaccuracies regarding 
immigration.146 For instance, many people criticize 
undocumented immigrants as making a choice to 
enter the country illegally in violation of  this nation’s 
laws. However, MALDEF counters that notion by 
pointing out that more than 2 million immigrants 
come to this country as minor children.147 On a 
related note, mixed status families exist throughout 
the United States, making it difficult to draw lines 
based on citizenship that dictate who belongs and 
who does not.148 These realities must become public 
knowledge in order to combat fear campaigns that 
dehumanize immigrants.
Litigation
Under current constitutional law, every time 
a fundamental right is implicated, a law must pass 
strict scrutiny.149 This standard requires that a law 
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest.150 
However, all immigration statutes, due to the 
plenary power afforded the federal government in 
regulating immigration, receive judicial deference.151 
Furthermore, the standard set forth in Fiallo states 
that even when fundamental rights that normally 
receive strict scrutiny, such as marriage, are at issue 
in the immigration context, deferential treatment 
still applies.152 However, Justice Marshall’s dissent, 
joined by Justice Brennan, should give civil rights 
attorneys a stepping stone to make legal arguments 
that immigration statutes should not always receive 
deferential treatment. Justice Marshall states:
[T]he Court appears to hold that 
discrimination among citizens, how-
ever invidious and irrational, must 
be tolerated if  it occurs in the con-
text of  the immigration laws. Since 
I cannot agree that Congress has 
license to deny fundamental rights 
to citizens according to the most 
disfavored criteria simply because 
the Immigration and Nationality 
Act is involved, I dissent.153
While Justice Marshall limits his criticism 
to discrimination in the immigration context that 
affects citizens, his dissent does promote the idea 
that immigration statutes should not always receive 
deferential treatment when fundamental rights are 
implicated. Cases brought by U.S. citizens who have 
been wrongfully deported could advance Justice 
Marshall’s stance. This argument can eventually be 
expanded to noncitizens by civil rights attorneys 
advocating the position that when fundamental 
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rights, such as being free from racial discrimination, 
are implicated, the Supreme Court should never 
apply deferential review, regardless of  the plaintiff ’s 
citizenship status.
A particularly compelling argument to 
incorporate is that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not restrict equal protection and due process to 
citizens since “[n]o State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of  citizens of  the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of  life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of  law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of  the laws.”154 The 
notion that people present in the United States are 
entitled to equal protection regardless of  citizenship 
status was supported in Plyer v. Doe.155 New legal 
arguments that attempt to extend the Court’s rationale 
in Plyer v. Doe must be advanced.
While the government may argue that national 
security is a compelling interest that allows for its 
unfettered discretion in regulating immigration, civil 
rights groups should argue that the Supreme Court 
must take a more nuanced approach to immigration 
and not treat it solely within the context of  the War 
on Terror. Additionally, civil rights groups must also 
argue that using racial profiling is not a narrowly 
tailored means of  achieving compelling interests 
related to national security.
Achieving more than deferential review of  
immigration statutes that discriminate, or lead to 
discrimination, is surely an uphill battle, but these 
legal arguments must be made. Perhaps justices will 
continue to dissent and provide even more fodder to 
civil rights attorneys making new legal arguments for 
stricter review of  immigration statutes.
Conclusion
SB 1070 exemplifies immigration laws’ 
reliance on race as an indicator of  non-belonging. 
In the process, notions of  racial inferiority abound 
as Hispanics become indistinguishable from 
“unwelcome illegal immigrants.” SB 1070’s mandate 
to identify noncitizens who do not belong is executed 
through racial profiling. Johnson would likely agree 
that Arizonans who support the law and recently 
reelected the governor who signed SB 1070 into 
law have transferred their racial animosity towards 
Hispanics to noncitizens. Ngai would likely agree 
that the consequences of  this transference results 
in a state of  alien citizenship for Hispanics whose 
citizenship has been made suspect by the law.
SB 1070 results from a long history of  racist 
immigration law and policy in the United States. In 
particular, the plenary power doctrine developed in 
Chae Chan Ping has facilitated the creation of  laws 
like SB 1070 that claim to merely mirror federal 
immigration law, which deprives noncitizens of  
vital constitutional protections. The central debate 
surrounding SB 1070 has become, who gets to do the 
excluding of  noncitizens: the states or the federal 
government?
The only way racism can become divorced 
from immigration law is to expose the general public 
to this nation’s history of  racism towards immigrants. 
Humanizing the immigrant experience is also 
important in order to question the idea that citizenship 
is the ultimate marker of  belonging. Furthermore, 
society must look into Johnson’s “magic mirror” 
and realize that its treatment of  immigrants of  color 
reflects how it views citizens of  color. On the legal 
front, civil rights and immigrants’ rights organizations 
must continue to fight the hard battle of  gaining 
more than deferential review of  immigration statutes. 
Only when these goals are accomplished will laws like 
SB 1070 lose public support.
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